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Background: Glivec (imatinib mesylate), produced by the pharmaceutical company Novartis, is prescribed in the
case of Chronic Myeloid Leukemia, one of the most common blood cancers in eastern countries. After more than a
decade of legal battles surrounding its patentability, the Supreme Court of India gave its final decision on April 1st
of 2013, rejecting the appeal of the Swiss giant drug manufacturer. In 2006, the Indian Patent Office first refused
Glivec’s patent under Section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Act arguing that it was only a modified version of an
existing drug, Imatinib, and therefore that the drug was not innovative. Novartis replied filing legal challenges
against the Indian government but the final verdict in April of 2013 ends the battle. Indeed, the Supreme Court
stated that even if the bioavailability of the drug was improved, it did not demonstrate enhanced efficacy and that
Glivec was not patentable.
Methods: The research primarily focused on journal, newspaper and magazine articles relevant to the time frame
of the lawsuit (from 1994 to 2013) as well as news searches through Google, Factiva, ProQuest, PubMed, and
YouTube where press articles from court verdicts were obtained by using the following keywords: “India”, “Novartis”,
“Glivec”, “Patent”, “Novartis Case”, and “Supreme Court of India”. The data sources were interpreted and analyzed
according to the authors’ own prior knowledge and understanding of the exigencies of the TRIPS Agreement.
Results: This case illuminates how India is interpreting international law to fit domestic public health needs.
Conclusions: The Novartis case arguably sets an important precedent for the global pharmaceutical industry and
ideally will help improve access to lifesaving medicines in the developing world by demanding that patient health
needs supersede commercial interests. The Supreme Court of India’s decision may affect the interpretation of the
article of the TRIPS Agreement, which states members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice.
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India’s pharmaceutical industry is considered as the 3rd
largest in the world in terms of volume and the 14th in
terms of its value. With China, Brazil and Russia, it led a
group of seventeen high-growth pharmaceuticals markets
also called “pharmerging countries” which are expected to
contribute to nearly 50% of the annual pharmaceutical
market growth in 2013 [1]. According to the research firm
IMS Health, sales in those emerging markets are predicted
to reach 30% of global pharmaceutical spending in 2016,* Correspondence: Jillian.kohler@utoronto.ca
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumcompared to 20% in 2011. India’s robust pharmaceutical
industry was estimated at over USD $10-billion in 2010
[2]. By 2020, pharmaceutical sales in India are predicted to
grow to as much as USD $74 billion – over six times than
what they were in 2010 [3]. But, despite its thriving
pharmaceutical market, improving its population’s access
to medicines is a key concern for a country that has nearly
“70% of its population living on less than USD $2 per day”
[4] and only 5% with access to private health insurance
[5]. Generic pharmaceutical manufacturers dominate the
Indian pharmaceutical market, accounting for up to 90%
of product sales [6]. According to Yusuf Hamied, chair-
man of the Indian pharmaceutical company CIPLA, “India
boasts more drug-manufacturing facilities that have beenentral Ltd. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited.
Gabble and Kohler Globalization and Health 2014, 10:3 Page 2 of 6
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/10/1/3approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration than
any other country outside of the United States” [7].
Given its capacity to produce large quantities of drugs at
cheap, affordable prices, India is known to many as the
“Pharmacy of the Developing World” as it has become a
leading supplier of generic medicines to many developing
countries [8]. For example, India’s production of HIV/AIDS
medications has helped lower the cost of treatment (a com-
bination of stavudine, lamivudine, and nevirapine) dramat-
ically from as much as USD $10,000 per year in 2000 to
USD $150 per year today [8]. India now supplies 80% of the
6 million people receiving treatment for HIV/AIDS in the
developing world today [9]. India also stands as “the second
leading provider of medicines distributed by UNICEF in
the developing world”. [10] Since 2005, India has been
obliged pursuant to the Trade Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement to put into place
revised patent laws in line with global standards. This has
in turn presented the country with a number of legal cases
that have had the potential to threaten its standing as a
major supplier of low-cost generic medicines globally. In
our paper, we examine the significant rejection, on April
1st, 2013, by the Supreme Court in India of an appeal by
the giant Swiss pharmaceutical company Novartis to patent
a modified version of its cancer drug, Glivec (imatinib
mesylate).
India and the TRIPS agreement
For well over 30 years, the Indian government did not
allow product patents for pharmaceutical inventions, pav-
ing the way for Indian generics companies to “freely pro-
duce medicines created by foreign drug companies at a
fraction of the cost” [2]. Process patents, on the other
hand, were recognized as they were seen as an incentive
for domestic manufacturers to develop “cheaper methods
of making expensive patented products”, and a way for the
Indian government to keep drug prices low [4]. In 1995,
India became a member of the World Trade Organization
(WTO), and was compelled to revise its patent laws fol-
lowing a ten-year transition period [11]. India’s adjusted
laws had to comply with the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, the
“WTO’s minimum standards for intellectual property pro-
tection” [4]. Thus, January 1st, 2005 saw the “implementa-
tion of substantially enhanced patent protection for
pharmaceuticals” in India, in that drug products were now
able to become patentable [12]. Following India’s commit-
ment to the TRIPS Agreement, the Times of India accused
the government of selling out to “rapacious” multina-
tionals and making citizens pay for the sellout [13]. Many
detractors argued that if India was fully compliant by
2006, as required under WTO obligations, changes in the
legislation and regulation of pharmaceuticals would make
India a net importer, instead of a net exporter in thesector. Others pointed out that the TRIPS Agreement is
not consistent with the economic and social conditions of
India and its terms are most harsh on those who are in
the greatest need. Echoing this sentiment, a former presi-
dent of the local pharmaceutical industry association
noted that, “The (Patents) Act has taken into consider-
ation the country’s socio-economic, developmental,
technological, and public interest needs. Thanks to the In-
dian Patents Act … the prices of drugs … are reasonable
and this has benefited the consumer at large” [14].
What is evident is that India has had a mixed approach
towards the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement,
availing itself to the full transition period for product pa-
tent protection, and delaying other commitments. For ex-
ample, India was slow to set up a mechanism (known as
the “mailbox” provision) that allows inventions to be noti-
fied to the patent officials, so that the invention can be
established as “new”. It also stalled on a second required
measure that involved exclusive marketing rights – that is
if a state allows the new drug to be marketed, the firm that
invented the pharmaceutical has the right to exclusively
market the drug for a period of time. This strategy of delay
suggests strongly that India, while committing to the spirit
of the TRIPS Agreement, has also sought to ensure that its
interpretation and implementation is in line with domestic
preferences. India’s domestic patent provisions have been
contested by the international research-based pharmaceut-
ical industry (Table 1). For example, provisions in its do-
mestic law that ban ‘evergreening’, a process in which
minor reformulations to a preexisting drug can be used to
extend patents (a common practice among pharmaceut-
ical companies in developed countries); and second its cri-
teria for ‘compulsory licensing’, a clause permissible under
the TRIPS Agreement, which under extenuating circum-
stances, permits a country to “force a firm to license a pat-
ented drug to a generic company” [4,11].
The Indian Government has adopted a strategy to en-
sure that its global commitments do not undercut domes-
tic priorities in the pharmaceutical system. That is, it is
seeking to interpret its obligations under TRIPS in a man-
ner that still permits the production of generic medicines
and keeps medicine prices as low as possible to facilitate
access to essential medicines [4]. In turn, this is presenting
serious market challenges for the research-based pharma-
ceutical industry.
The Novartis case
Glivec (imatinib mesylate), produced by the Swiss
pharmaceutical giant Novartis, is used to treat Chronic
Myeloid Leukemia (CML) and Gastrointestinal Stromal
Tumours (GIST), and is patented in 35 countries across the
world [11]. According to Lee [4], studies have shown that
Glivec is “almost ten times more effective than traditional
interferon therapy”, due to its ability to target specific
Table 1 International research-based pharmaceutical cases in India [3]
Company Drug Issue Now
Bayer Nexavar (kidney cancer) Patent office ordered Bayer to license its drug
to an Indian firm to produce low-cost generics
IPAB rejected Bayer’s appeal to overturn compulsory
license on Mar 4, 2013; Bayer to now appeal decision
to Mumbai High Court
Bayer Nexavar (kidney cancer) Sued Cipla, an Indian firm, for patent infringement Hearing in Dec 2012
Novartis Glivec (leukaemia) India refused to grant Swiss firm a patent in 2006 Indian Supreme Court rejected Novartis’ patent
plea on April 1, 2013 after 7-year battle
Roche Tarceva (cancer) Sued Indian companies for infringing its patent Delhi High Court dismissed Roche’s patent
infringement suit in Sept 2012 after 4-year struggle
Roche Valcyte (AIDS) Patent office revoked Roche’s patent Appeal pending to IPAB*
Gilead Viread (HIV) Patent office rejected two patents Appealed; the case is still pending
*Intellectual Property Appellate Board.
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manent cure from cancer … [it] only stalls its progress. For
patients, the drug needs to be taken lifelong” [10]. For this
reason, along with the fact that 95% of Indians do not pos-
sess private health insurance, its pricing plays a critical fac-
tor in cancer patients’ ability to access a continuous supply
of Glivec for effective treatment. What is important to bear
in mind, is that there is a significant price gap between the
patented version of Glivec and its generic copy, as a
monthly dose of the former can cost as much as USD
$5,000 in the U.S., whereas a monthly dose of the latter can
be purchased for just USD$200 in India [9]. In 2006, the In-
dian Patent Office rejected Novartis’ patent application for
Glivec under Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act, stating
that the drug was a modification of an existing substance,
imatinib, and therefore represented a case of ‘evergreening’
[15]. Section 3(d) articulates that reformulations of pre-
existing drugs, which do not improve the efficacy of the
product, are ineligible for extended patents [16]. This
provision was included primarily to safeguard public
health interests [16]. Unfortunately, “neither the Indian
patent statute nor its implementing rules define ‘efficacy’”,
and there are no available guidelines for companies like
Novartis seeking second-generation patents (i.e., extended
patents on modifications of previous products) [16]. Thus,
the interpretation of the word “efficacy” is central to this
case. The Novartis case is a landmark case because it rep-
resents critical issues related to intellectual property pro-
tection and access to medicines, which will impact how
multinational pharmaceutical companies conduct business
in India in the future, as well as India’s role as the “Phar-
macy of the Developing World”. India’s verdict is likely to
serve as a model for other developing countries in terms
of how they choose to interpret their obligations pursuant
to the TRIPS Agreement [10].
History of the case
Novartis’ attempts to patent Glivec in India span well over
a decade (see Figure 1). In 1993, Novartis filed patents
worldwide for imatinib, the precursor for the currentversion of its drug Glivec [11]. However, it did not do so
in India as India at the time did not offer product patent
protection [11]. In 1997, when Novartis developed the
beta crystalline form of imatinib – imatinib mesylate –
which it found to have 30% more bioavailability than its
non-salt form (i.e., absorbed 30% more easily into the
bloodstream), the company applied for a second round of
patents, this time including India [11]. The patent applica-
tion was received under India’s ‘mailbox’ provisions, a
scheme which allowed companies to request patents while
the Indian government transitioned towards a revised
intellectual property legal system in 2005 at the behest
of the World Trade Organization [4,11]. However, In-
dian generic producers were manufacturing and selling
Glivec at less than 10% of the patented version’s price,
compelling Novartis to put pressure on the Indian gov-
ernment to take a stance on intellectual property pro-
tection [4]. In response, the Indian government granted
the company Exclusive Marketing Rights (EMR) until
its application came up for review [4]. This decision put
a stop to the majority of the production of generic ver-
sions of Glivec in India, thereby resulting in massive ac-
cess barriers for individuals seeking affordable cancer
treatment [8]. Several generic companies and not-for-
profit organizations such as the Cancer Patients Aid
Association (CPAA) rallied together to protest against
Novartis’ EMR status, and filed an opposition against
the company’s patent application, which was due for
examination in 2005, the year when India would offi-
cially begin to look at both new and ‘mail-boxed’ patent
requests [8]. In 2006, pursuant to Section 3(d) of the
Indian Patent’s Act, the Indian Patents Office rejected
Novartis’ patent application for its drug Glivec, citing
that it did not demonstrate any significant changes in
therapeutic effectiveness over its pre-existing form,
which was already patented outside India [15]. In rebut-
tal, Novartis filed two legal challenges against the Indian
government later that year – one appealing the rejection
of its patent request, and the second contesting Section
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Figure 1 Timeline of the Novartis case.
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[3]. In August 2007, the Madras High Court ruled
against Novartis’s attempt to overturn Section 3(d), and
in 2009, the Intellectual Property Appellate Board in
India rejected the company’s appeal against the rejec-
tion of its patent application [2]. Novartis then filed a
new case with the Indian Supreme Court, disputing the
basis of these decisions, and the final decision came out
in early April 2013.Methods
We searched for a wide range of sources, including schol-
arly journals, briefing documents, newspaper and magazine
articles as well as video interviews with key stakeholders in
order to gather a comprehensive and up-to-date view of
the Novartis case in India and its far-reaching implica-
tions on the global pharmaceutical industry. Scholarly
sources were peer-reviewed, and were drawn from nu-
merous databases, primarily through ProQuest (Inter-
disciplinary) via the University of Toronto Libraries
website. Our searches consisted of keywords such
as ‘Novartis’, ‘India’, ‘intellectual property’, ‘patent’, and
‘Glivec’ to keep the perspective broad and view the
issue from as many angles as possible. Sources were se-
lected based on their relevance to the topic and date of
publication from 1994 to 2013. Data sources were
interpreted and analyzed according to our own prior
knowledge and understanding of the exigencies of the
TRIPS Agreement. Finally, our research was assembled
into the current report to showcase the progression of
the Novartis case over time and highlight its signifi-
cance to intellectual property rights and access to med-
icines in the larger global health context.Results and discussion
Novartis’ perspectives
According to Novartis, Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents
Act should not have applied to Glivec at all. The company
asserts that the initial patented form of the drug, imatinib,
was only the first step in developing the current version,
and could not be administered to patients [15]. Only by
making the drug in its current salt form, imatinib mesy-
late, could it become a viable treatment [15]. Novartis sci-
entists cite that this new form allows patients to take the
drug “in a pill form that…deliver[s] consistent, safe, and
effective levels of the medicine” [12]. Furthermore, ima-
tinib mesylate exhibits 30% more bioavailability and is
more stabile during production [6]. These improvements
led to the awarding of a second-generation patent in
the United States in 2001 [3]. Novartis also argued, that
“Indian patent laws should distinguish between patented
inventions and the version of the drug that is on the mar-
ket for patients” [6]. The company sought a patent for the
original molecule to protect the invention, however, a new
patent was being sought to protect the medicine.
Moreover, not only did Novartis challenge India’s deci-
sion to reject its patent application for Glivec, but it also
questioned the validity of Section 3(d) under the TRIPS
Agreement. Citing Article 27 of TRIPS, which “generally
mandates patentability where inventions are new, involve an
inventive step (or are non-obvious), and are capable of in-
dustrial application (or are useful)” [5], Novartis claims that
imatinib mesylate represented an “inventive step” in the drug
development process due to its 30% increase in bioavailabil-
ity [5]. To be sure, the TRIPS Agreement is sufficiently
vague and does not explicitly define what an “inventive
step” entails [5]. India technically has the flexibility to inter-
pret criteria under TRIPS based on national socioeconomic
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position, and argued that lax patent laws like those in India
may lead to the stifling of innovation in the pharmaceutical
sector [16]. Novartis and other pharmaceutical companies
argue that the research and development process is long
and expensive, and a stable system that protects intellectual
property rights is essential so that companies can recoup
their expenses [16]. According to Novartis, access to the lat-
est life-saving drugs for people in India and the developing
world is dependent on patent protection [16]. In its efforts
to safeguard public health interests by denying Glivec a pa-
tent, India may just as easily be compromising the very sys-
tem that helps create new lifesaving medicines for the
people who need them.
Perspective of government of India
The Indian Government argued that Novartis’ patent appli-
cation for Glivec should be rejected because the modified
version of the drug did not exemplify a significant change
in therapeutic effectiveness over its previous form [10]. It
stated “… the selection of a salt of the active ingredient with
the purpose of improving bioavailability (also referred to as
‘evergreening’) is well-known in pharmaceutical art” [10].
India’s patent laws contain certain provisions such as
Section 3(d), which ban this sort of practice in order to
protect access to medicines for its population [8]. The
pricing of cancer treatment is arguably the most import-
ant factor in determining India’s position in the case: a
monthly dose of the patented version of Glivec (around
USD$2,600 per patient) is over three times an average
Indian’s annual income.
India has also argued that under the Doha Declaration
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health of 2001 its ac-
tions are legal. This provision states that the “the TRIPS
Agreement can and should be interpreted and imple-
mented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ rights
to protect public health and, in particular, to promote ac-
cess to medicines for all” [11]. The Indian government
and its supporters argue that Section 3(d) of the Indian
Patents Act, although not explicitly contained within
TRIPS, allows them the ability to interpret patent laws in
favor of national public health interests [11]. Therefore,
Indian patent laws are indeed constitutional, contrary to
claims made by Novartis’ legal representatives.
Implications of India’s Supreme Court rejection of
Novartis’ appeal
The Novartis case started in 1998 when the company filed
a patent application, which was denied in 2006, and only
reached a final decision in April 2013 when India’s Supreme
Court determined that the beta crystalline form of Glivec
was ultimately not patentable. Section 3(d) of the Indian
Patent Act, which expresses that minor changes to existing
molecules will not be deemed as sufficient for furtherpatent protection, was critical to this case [17]. Indeed, the
court indicated that “therapeutic efficacy needs to be en-
hanced in order for an adapted compound to be consid-
ered to fall outside of the Section 3(d) exclusion” [17]. The
verdict of the Novartis case “confirms the right of India’s
Parliament to implement public health safeguards avail-
able under the TRIPS Agreement” [18].
Furthermore, the decision to reject Novartis’ patent “has
global significance since India’s generic drug industry, val-
ued at approximately USD $26 billion, supplies much of
the cheap medicine used in the developing world” [19]. It
illuminates how a government will take action to ensure
that medicines are made affordable for its population. Also,
this outcome may very well serve as an important model
to other developing countries, which would want to ensure
that their patent laws do not result in public health com-
promises. It is relevant then that both Argentina and
Philippines adopted a law similar to Section 3(d) [20].
The 300,000 patients currently taking the drug and
their advocates welcomed the verdict [21]. According to
Dr Unni Karunakara, the Médecins Sans Frontières
(MSF) International President: “The Supreme Court’s
decision now makes patents on the medicines that we
desperately need less likely. This sends a very strong sig-
nal to Novartis and other multinational pharmaceutical
companies that they cannot try to game Indian patent
law” [22]. This decision has “no precedent”, explained
Pratibha Singh, a lawyer from the Indian drug manufac-
turer Cipla, because from now on “patents will be given
for genuine inventions, and repetitive patents will not
be given for minor tweaks to existing drugs” [19].
Novartis’ reaction was not surprisingly stated as an
economic and research threat. It stated that the “deci-
sion … discourages innovative drug discovery essential
to advancing medical science for patients” [20]. It fur-
ther stated that: “Novartis most certainly continues to
seek patents for its innovative products in India … but
will be cautious in investing in India especially with regard
to introduction of innovative medicines” [20]. However,
Novartis in an effort to minimize negative publicity also
strategically noted that the 16,000 people (which represent
around 95% of the patients currently taking the branded
drug Glivec in India) from the “Novartis Glivec Inter-
national Patient Assistance Program” will continue to re-
ceive the drug free of charge. [22].
Conclusion
The Novartis case arguably sets an important precedent
for access to medicines by putting the pharmaceutical in-
dustry on the reach of patent law. The Supreme Court of
India’s decision may very well serve as a future model for
other developing countries in how they choose to interpret
and implement the TRIPS Agreement. This case illumi-
nates how India is respecting its global obligations
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domestic needs are respected by interpreting its legal obli-
gations in a way that is commensurate with domestic pref-
erences and needs. The ruling puts social justice over
commercial interests and also helps India’s own domestic
industry. This is the first time that Indian law has been im-
plemented to prohibit patents on drugs with only minor
changes to an existing one. Now, only truly new and in-
novative medicines with real therapeutic impact will be
protected via patenting. What we see in the case of India
is a complex game that results in tension between global
trade commitments and domestic public health concerns.
The latter in this case has clearly taken precedence.
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